The Law of Defamation, The European Convention on Human
Rights and The Human Rights Act 1998
The aim of this study is to consider, via an
analytical approach, the effect on the law of defamation of the implementation
of the European Convention on Human Rights and the Human Rights 1998 and
whether or not the law of defamation strikes an appropriate balance between the
need to protect reputation and the general right of freedom of speech. During the conduct of this study a number of
points will be discussed. The points to
be discussed are the law of defamation and where it is located, and its
working. There will be an indepth
analysis of how the law addresses the difference between what is considered to
be defamatory and the right to freedom of speech. Finally, the effect of the implementation of the European
Convention on Human Rights and the Human Rights 1998 and whether or not it has
struck an appropriate balancce between the need to protect reputation and the
general right of freedom of speech will be subject to an indepth and thorough
analysis.
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Before the impact and effect of the implementation
of the European Convention on Human Rights and the Human Rights 1998 on the law
of defamation can be discussed, it is imperative that an in depth analysis of
the law of defamation is undertaken.
This analysis will address what the law of defamation is, where it can
be located and how it is applied in scenarios where defamation has occurred.
Defamation, which is the generic name for the torts
of slander and libel, is an area of tort which has two names according to
Stanton. He states that the first of these two aims
is to provide a remedy with which a person can protect his or her reputation
from attack. This particular role of
the tort of defamation aims to safegaurd a person’s reputation rather than his
or her privacy. The tort of defamation
provides a remedy against the publication of untruths as opposed to unfair
revelations of long forgotten truths or intrusions into a person’s private
life. The second aim of the tort of
defamation is to protect the right of freedom of speech and thus the ability of
the press to investigate, and to bring to the public’s attention,
malpractice. Stanton
is of the view that there can be no doubt that both of these aims of the law of
defamation can conflict and that the attempt to maintain a proper balance
between them is one of the explanations for the complexity of this particular
area of tort law. Giliker and Beckwith agree with Stantion in recognising that the law of defamation must therefore
attempt to balance the competing rights of freedom of expression and protection
for one’s reputation. They are of the
opinion that the only way to approach defamation is logically and in stages: (a) Is the statement defamatory? (b) Does it refer to the claimant? (c)
Has it been published? (d) Do any of the defences apply?
Jones
states that the tort of defamation protects a person from untrue imputations
which harm his reputation with others.
He states that it should be distinguished from an untrue statement which
does not cause damage to the plaintiff’s reputation but does cause harm. With the law of defamation, if the words
complained of are defamatory then there is a presumption that the words
complained of are untrue unless proved otherwise by the defendant. It is important to note that with defamation
maliciousness is not an element that is essential and the majority of forms of
defamation are actionable per se. Jones
states that defamation is a very peculiar tort in that it is one of the few
forms of civil actions that are still tried with juries. It should be noted that actions for
defamation can only be brought in the High Court. Gatley
states that:
“a
man commits the tort of defamation when he publishes to a third person words
containing an untrue imputation against the
reputation of another.”
This definition of defamation does require some form
of clarification. Basically, a
defamatory imputation is an imputation in a form of words which tends to have
the following effect on the claimant.
The imputation will lower the claimant in the estimation of fair and
right-thinking members of society in general, or it will expose him to hatred,
contempt or ridicule, or it will cause the claimant to be shunned and or
avoided. An imputation may be
defamatory and thus lead to a successful action against the defendant even
where the imputation is true. An
imputation is not necessarily defamatory where it is deemed to be untrue. Carey
also makes the suggestion that defamation is, in fact, a cause of action which
seems incapable of having a precise definition. He states that judges have offered definitions only to be
criticised by other judges and academics.
It was not until the Faulks Committee on defamation
recommeded the following definition:
“the
publication to a third party of matter which in all the circumstances would be
likely
to affect a person adversely in the
estimation of reasonable people generally.”
Carey
states that whatever definition of defamation people wish to use the principles
which have already been discussed above are certainly and totally true.
Carey
states it is imperative that all communicators must be aware of the tort of
defamation. He states that the threat
of such an action is probably the most serious curb to media freedom in this
country. Those working in the media
industry must be alert to the risk of defamation at every stage of the
publishing or broadcasting process.
Carey goes on to cite several factors which make the risk of a defamation
action a particularly serious influence on the media. It is possible to commit the tort even where one is unaware that
a person’s reputation is affected by the communication in question. Every person in the chain of communication
may be sued for damages by the claimant.
To conclude this section it is vitally important to
not that defamation actually takes on two different forms. The two different forms are libel and
slander. These two forms are quite
different. Libel relates to the written
published word and slander is defamation in a transient form such as the spoken
word. Libel is actionable per se and is
a crime as well as a tort. Slander,
which may be subject to certain limited exceptions, has the requirement that
the claimant must provide proof of special damage. Special damage is damage which is damage that is qualifiable in
monetary terms. Slander can be
actionable per se but only in exceptional cases. An example of the exceptional
cases concerned are those in which the claimant is imputed to have committed a
criminal offence punishable with imprisonment.
The final part of this section that must be
considered before the analysis of the impact and effect of the implementation
of the European Convention on Human Rights and the Human Rights 1998 on the law
of defamation can be discussed and analysed in depth is where the law of
defamation located. The law and
princples that regulate the law of defamation may be found in the Defamation
Acts of 1952 and 1996.
This investigation will now place its emphasis on
the analysis of the impact and effect of the implementation of the European
Convention on Human Rights and the Human Rights 1998 on the law of
defamation. There are two main
provisions of this legislation. The
first of these main provisions is Article 10 of the European Convention on
Human Rights. Article 10 provides that:
“1. Everyone has the right to freedom of
expression. This right shall include
freedom to
hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without
interference
by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States
from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema
enterprises.
2. The
exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and
responsibilities,
may be subject to such formalities,
conditions, restrictions or penalties as are
prescribe by law and are necessary in a
democratic society, in the interests of
national security, territorial
integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder
of crime, for the protection of health
or morals, for the protection of the reputation
or the rights of others, for
preventing the disclosure of information received in
confidence, or for maintaining the
authority and impartiality of the judiciary.”
Article 10(2) of the European Convention on Human
Rights recognises that the right to freedom of expression cannot go
unchallenged. Article 10 of the
European Convention on Human Rights has now been incorporated into English law
by the Human Rights Act 1998. The
second of these main provisions may be located in Section 12 of the Human Rights
Act 1998. Section 12 makes provision
for the freedom of expression and provides as follows:
“(1) This section applies if a court is
considering whether to grant any relief which, if
granted, might affect the exercise of the Covention
right to freedom of expression.
(2) If the
person against whom the application for relief is made (“the respondent”) is
neither
present nor represented, no such relief is to be granted unless the court is
satisfied
–
(a) that
the applicant has taken all practicable steps to notify the respondent; or
(b) that
there are compelling reasons why the respondent should not be notified.
(3) No
such relief is to be granted so as to restrain publication before trial unless
the
court is satisfied that the applicant
is likely to establish that publication should not
be allowed.
(4) The
court must have particular regard to the importance of the Convention right to
freedom of expression and, where the
proceedings relate to material which the
respondent claims, or which appears to
the court, to be journalistic, literary or
artistic material (or to conduct
connected with such material), to –
(a) the
extent to which –
(i)
the material has, or is about to, become available to the
public; or
(ii)
it is, or would be, in the public interest for the material to
be published.
(b) any
relevant privacy code.
(5) In
this section –
“court” includes a tribunal;
and
“relief” includes any
remedy or order (other than in criminal proceedings).”
The Human Rights Act 1998 came into force in the
United Kingdom in October 2000 and the purpose and meaning of the Human Rights
Act 1998 was to give a form of further effect to the rights and freedoms which
have guaranteed by the provisions under the European Convention on Human
Rights.
Jones
states that it was the Faulks Committee that suggested that the purpose of the law of defamation was to preserve a
balance between the individual’s right to protect his reputation and the
general right of free speech but it is questionable whether the presesnt law
strikes the correct balance. The crux
of the problem is very well and quite neatly illustrated in Tolstoy Miloslavsky
v. United Kingdom. In this case the plaintiff obtained a
declaration from the European Court of Human Rights that libel damages of £1.5
million awarded against him by an English jury amounted to a violation of his
right to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the European Convention on
Human Rights. Even though the United
Kingdom is a signatory to the Convention, however, it has not formally adopted
it as part of its constitutional law.
Therefore, the decision in Tolstoy Miloslavsky v. United Kingdom can only be symbolic and the plaintiff’s victory pyrrhic. Jones
states that on the other hand it is significant that the House of Lords drew
heavily on a more generalised common law principle of freedom of speech to
justify their decision in Derbyshire County Council v. Times Newspapers Ltd.,
but it remains to be seen whether or not this will herald a new era in which,
in the absence of a formal constitutional footing, the right to freedom of
expression might nonetheless enjoy more positive judicial protection. In Derbyshire County Council v. Times
Newspapers Ltd. the
plaintiff, a local authority, had brought an action for damages for libel
against The Times in respect of two newspaper articles which had questioned the
propriety of its financial dealings.
Gatley
also reserves a valid opinion regarding the right to free expression. He is of the view that the freedom of
expression will provide a powerful restraint on the enforcement of rights to
reputation because of the high value placed upon it by the Court. In Lingens v. Austria
the court stated that:
“freedom
of expression, as secured by paragraph 1 of Article 10, constitutes one of the
essential foundations of a democratic
society and one of the basic conditions for its
progress and for each individual’s self-fulfilment. Subject to paragraph 2, it is
applicable not only to ‘information’ or ‘ideas’ that are favourably
received or regarded
as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those
that offend, shock or
disturb.
Such are the demands of that pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness
without which there is no ‘democratic
society’. “
This means that the right is also to be viewed in
broad terms as applying to both information and ideas, opinions and comments as
well as objectively verifiable facts.
In order to conclude this study it is essential that
the future relationship of the European Convention on Human Rights with United
Kingdom be analysed. The present Labour
Government gave a commitment in 1997 that European Convention on Human Rights
would be incorporated into United Kingdom law.
Assuming legislative implementation follows the plans that they
announced via a consultation paper
it is widley expected that the new domestic Bill of Rights will incorporate the
substantive rights in the European Convention on Human Rights and will allow
all domestic courts to apply the Convention and to make rulings based on
it. Gatley
states that this will extend the impact of the Convention in English law
by ensuring it can come into play in all cases, including where a statute is
clear within its own terms or where common law is settled. Gatley
finishes by stating that Convention arguments are also more likely to be raised
in United Kingdom courts if it is only to ensure the exhaustion of domestic
remedies so as to permit an application to Strasbourg.
Giliker & Beckwith
have come to the conclusion that the law of defamation is a difficult and very
complex area of law but it is an area of law which is of considerable interest
to anyone who is concerned how the law of tort deals with the difficult issues
of freedom of expression and the rights of individuals to protect their
reputation from attack. Giliker &
Beckwith are of the view that although the Defamation Act 1996 has made an
attempt to deal with these problems there is quite clearly quite a long way to
go until these problems are eradicated.
They say that it seems likely that the incorporation of the European
Convention on Human Rights inot English law by the Human Rights Act 1998 will
serve to encourage the debate.
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