The history of American army finds its origin in the mid of the 18th century. The U.S. Army proved its strength during major crisis, whether it would be the Civil War or else, and still persistent as in the Operation of Freedom in Iraq and going on, only pursuing the main core of its national policy to fight for God and state. American Civil War is more than something beyond the resolution for historians. As the war occurred in the first half of the 20th century, it has been regarded a considerable turning point for U.S. economy by the contemporary spectators, and termed it as the Second American Revolution. They asserted that the so-called Civil War actually a social war, which provided the opportunity of establishment of the new power in the government causing huge transformations in the industrial development and in the constitution too. During the post World War II period, Scholars who had a good command on economics, started to burn their energies in sorting out the consequences of modern implications in the economic growth and development of the U.S. They started discovering the basics factors of U.S. development in the coming century, and those historians probed whether the Civil War with its colossal devastation and distraction of society could have been an incentive to industrialization.
The purpose of this paper is to establish a research about the Civil War of the United States of America to identify that how this war creates the implications in our modern world.
Civil War of United State
The American Civil War is considered the first modern war because it employed the use of mass recruitment, military railroads, modern cartridge firearms, rifles and machine guns, trench warfare, submarines, ironclads, aerial reconnaissance. It presented the disgust of the whole war to the rest of the world. The overall impact of the Civil War was immense, for instance it rendered the United States the status of being a potential player on the world stage. And this is still argued among historians that, the motivation of being a key player was the main reason behind the Spanish-American War, Philippine-American War, and U.S. involvement in the Boxer Rebellion (Cimbala, 2010).
The tendencies of addressing the same problems repeatedly lie with Historical research. The endeavors to find out the regional designs of economic development and the timing of the touching the heights of industrialization, along with the research into the implications of the Southern slave system and the effects of liberation, again grasped the attention of the historians. While a new group of economic researchers one more time determined to analyze the implications of the Civil War. That reassessment conducted by those economic researchers usually can be assembled under four captions as the financial factors of the war; the expenses of the war; the issue of financing the War; and a review of the Hacker-Beard research that the War was a decisive moment in determining the new course of American economic history (Goldin, 2005).
Implications of Civil War in Modern World
Generally The American Civil War is known as the first modern war, because it mainly describes the huge efforts by both sides to conduct the war. According to the first concern that what was the cost of this war, one may find the answer in the comprehensive research work done by Claudia Goldin. The Goldin (2005) divided the costs into two classes: one is the direct costs which contain the expenditures of governments plus the loss from devastation of land and the loss of human lives; and the other one is the indirect costs of the war which contains the succeeding implications of the war after 1865, and the combined expenditure is estimated in 1860, almost 3.3 billion dollar. They also estimated 1.8 billion dollar, regarding the cost of the reduced economic value and deaths during the war, and 1.5 billion dollar, regarding the cost of devastation in the South. This provides a sum of 6.6 billion dollar in direct costs (Goldin, 2005).
However, this estimation is just a vague idea of definite expenditure and cost of the war, and it provides a scholarly estimation to calculate the economic struggle needed to set the war. Additionally the volume of the bill is the inconsistency in the burden these expenses represented to the people of South as well as North. The expenses were almost 150 dollar to the North people and 376 dollar for the South people, two and half time respectively more, on the basis of per capita (Hansen, 2003).
Such figures are though surprising, but they give just a fraction of the total cost of the American Civil War which stayed long after the fighting had closed. One method to calculate the full "expenses" and "advantages" of the war, Goldin (2005) argue, is to examine the cost of the observed postwar flow of consumption in each area compare that figures to the evaluated flow of consumption when there was no war (Goldin, 2005). The Goldin (2005) present the estimation of lost consumption for the South for the reduced value was 6.2 billion dollar; and 1.15 billion dollar for the North. This method is though creative, but it holds some serious disadvantages that any reason can cause consumption lost, not just the war. Especially for the South, it could not be completely attributed to the war after 1860, the increase in the demand for cotton that enhanced the economy did not persist, and there was a remarkable change in the supply of labor because of the liberation.
As a result, afterward the figures of lost consumption because to the war down to 2.56 billion dollars for the South were amended by the Goldin (2005), to eliminate the consequences of liberation and the downfall of the cotton market. The volume of the indirect effects, after the amendments, is estimated more than 10 billion dollar. Distributing the total to each region develops a per capita burden of 199 billion dollar in the North and 670 billion dollar in the South. In the North, consumption had restored its postwar stage by 1873, nevertheless in the South consumption persisted under its 1860 stage to the last years of the century (Goldin, 2005).
In American history none of the war damaged the economic resources of the nation as the Civil War resulted. Governmental management on both sides was compelled to utilize to have a financial borrowing to encounter the financial commitment for the war (Hansen, 2003). They could ultimately make war goods required for the war with the help of more developed markets and an industrial structure. The Union was evidently in a better position to face this matter. The South, in contrast, had always depended on either Northern or foreign financial funds for their financial requirements, and they had actually no effective manufacturing structure to make military goods. From the beginning, the Confederates depended profoundly on finance borrowed outside the South to buy supplies from foreign market (Cimbala, 2010).
The attempt of the Confederate government to recompense for their war struggles were much more anarchic comparatively in the North and consistent expenses and returns records did not exist. Numerous characteristics of Confederate finance policy directly stick out in contrast to the Union effort. Among them the first one is the breakdown of the Richmond government to support their war expenses through levying taxes. During the war period, tax returns estimated for only 11 percent of all income (Catton, 2004). Another difference was the much elevated fraction of returns estimated for by the issuance of currency by the Richmond government. And it also estimated that over a third of the Confederate government's income contributed by the printing press, while the remaining arrived in the shape of bonds, many of which were put up for sale in foreign market in either London or Amsterdam. The dependence on borrowed finance established to be a mounting issue for the Confederate finance department. By the middle of 1864 the volume of interest on outstanding government bonds captivated more than half all government expenses. The troubles of tax collection and floating of new bond issues had turned into a serious that in the last year of the war the whole income collected by the Confederate Government in fact deteriorated (Catton, 2004).
On the whole, it is obvious that the North did quite better job of organizing the economic resources required to keep on the war. The huge complexity and size of Northern markets destined that the Union government could urge institutional planning that provided for a more competent system of transmitting resources into war supplies comparatively was probable in the South. The Confederates relied quite more upon foreign resources and direct involvement in the manufacturing of goods and services for their war struggle, towards end the domestic economy could not manage under the stress of the struggle (Hansen, 2003). It is of no concern in this context that the Union barrier, which during the year of 1863 had mainly stopped up not only the foreign dealings of the Southern region with Europe States, but also the coastal exchange of goods that had become a significant part in the transportation system, may have performed a more critical role in stimulating the ultimate fall down of the Southern war struggle comparatively is often acknowledged (Catton, 2004).
It is easily observable why contemporary generation assumed that the American Civil War was a breaking point instance in U.S. History. With a loss of billions of dollars and 625,000 causalities and slavery had been eliminated as the Union had been conserved. Economic observers had been seeing the event at 50 years later and could note that the half-century afterward the Civil World War had been a time of remarkable development and growth of the U.S. economy. But was the war actually the Second American Revolution as Beard 1927 & Hacker 1940 claimed? That was definitely the contemporary view as late as in the year 1960, when Thomas Cochran Childs 1961 wrote an essay named "Did the Civil War Retard Industrialization?" (Cochran, 1961)
Cochran indicated that in the nineties fifties there was no solid proof to prove or disprove the Beard-Hacker theory. New quantitative study and he disagreed and demonstrated that the fighting had in fact decelerated the scale of industrial development and people. Eric Foner 2002, stretched out Cochran's assertion by offending the Beard-Hacker argue that political transformations and specifically the way in 1862 of the Republican policy of political financial system that had been suppressed in Congress by Southern resistance were influential in increasing economic growth (Foner 2002). The key point of these conflicting arguments was that neither the war legislation was compulsory for industrialization nor which was previously well in progress by eighteen sixties. "Aside from commercial banking," noted one observer, "the Civil World War seems not to have begun or made by any new outlines of economic institutional transform" (Foner 2002). Cochran 1961 had been no war and these opponents disagreed that the path of economic expansion that appeared after 1870s would have acted so anyway (Cochran, 1961).
Regardless of this disparagement, the idea of a "second" American Revolution lives on. Obviously the Beards, Hacker were in mistake in their assertion that the industrial development increased during the war and The Civil World War, like most contemporary wars, engaged a huge struggle to organize resources to execute the fight and this had the impact of making it seems that the financial development was increasing due to the making of military commodities (Foner, 2002). Nevertheless, Beard and Hacker had several good other observers and mistook this raised wartime activity as a net growth in production when in fact what occurred is that resources were moved away from user products towards war goods manufacturing (Cochran, 1961). But what is the leading question of political transform ensuing from the war?
Opponents of Beard and Hacker asserted that the Republican program would have ultimately been passed even if there had been no war. Therefore, the war was not a grave decisive point in economic growth. The issue with this line of disagreement is that it totally ignores the point of the Beard-Hacker disagreement and they would concur that in the nonexistence of a conflict the Republican policy of political financial system would win and because of that war occurred (William, 2004).
Observers who disagree that economic issues were a basic reason of sectional differences go on to indicate that war was possibly the only way to resolve those differences. In this prospect, the war was a turning point instance in the economic growth of America because the Union military success made sure that the "market revolution" would not be thwarted by the South's effort to break up the Union (Hansen, 2003).
No matter what the consequences had to the war on industrial development, economic observers agree that the war had a deep impact on the South. The demolition of slavery meant that the whole Southern economy had to be reconstructed. This turned out to be an enormous objective; far larger than anybody at the time supposed and as stated above in the debate of the indirect expenses of the war of the Southerners bore an unequal share of those expenses and the burden continued long after the war had finished. The failure of the Southern economy to restore has generated a wide literary work that goes beyond the consequences of the war (Foner, 2002).
Economic observers who have observed the sudden impacts of the war had reached a few significant ends. But first the notion that the South was actually ruined by war has been mainly discarded. Most historians have agreed the assertion of Thomas Childs Cochran (1961) that the main "damage" to the South from the fighting was that the reduction and ignorance of possessions on farms as a large portion of the man workforce went off to fighting for many years and the second point was that the effect of liberation (Cochran, 1961). Slaveholders lost their huge investment in slaves as the consequence of liberation. Farmers were ultimately strapped for capital in the years back then suddenly after the war and this influenced their options with regard to labor agreements with the liberty and in their contacts with capital markets to get borrowed funds for the farming. The liberated peoples and their families reacted to liberation by returning to a 3rd of their labor from the marketplace. While this is a entirely practical reaction, it had the impact of producing an apparent labor "scarcity" it persuaded white landowners hat a librated labor system would not help with the ex-slaves; therefore further confusing a previously disturbed labor market. In the longer run, as Paul Cimbala (2010) put it, liberation changed the white landlords from "labor-lords" to "landowners." This was not a simple change (Paul, 2010). But while they were capable for the major portion to cling to their land possessions the ex-slaveholders were eventually compelled to disintegrate the great agricultural estates that had been the foundation of the antebellum Southern financial system and rent small pieces of land to the librated peoples under using a new shape of leasing agreement sharecropping. From a state where tenancy was very infrequent, the South immediately became a rural economy attributed by renter farms.
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